Behavioral decision theories aim to explain human behavior. Can they help predict it? An open tournament for prediction of human choices in fundamental economic decision tasks is presented. The results suggest that integration of certain behavioral theories as features in machine learning systems provides the best predictions. Surprisingly, the most useful theories for prediction build on basic properties of human and animal learning and are very different from mainstream decision theories that focus on deviations from rational choice. Moreover, we find that theoretical features should be based not only on qualitative behavioral insights (e.g. "loss aversion"), but also on quantitative behavioral foresights generated by functional descriptive models (e.g. Prospect Theory). Our analysis prescribes a recipe for derivation of explainable, useful predictions of human decisions. 1 Correspondence to: oplonsky@gmail.com 2 Many societal and engineering problems can benefit enormously from accurate predictions of human decisions. For example, good predictions of human decisions to moral dilemmas can inform the development of autonomous vehicles and the design of life-saving kidney exchange programs (1-3). Machine learning methods have had impressive success in predicting human decisions when trained on large amount of data (4-7). However, when the data available for training is relatively small, like in many decision-making domains of interest to social scientists, purely data-driven methods have had mixed success. For example, such methods led to good performance in prediction of human decisions in economic games (8, 9) , but performed much worse than purely behavioral models in prediction of human decisions between lotteries (10, 11).
Many societal and engineering problems can benefit enormously from accurate predictions of human decisions. For example, good predictions of human decisions to moral dilemmas can inform the development of autonomous vehicles and the design of life-saving kidney exchange programs (1-3). Machine learning methods have had impressive success in predicting human decisions when trained on large amount of data (4) (5) (6) (7) . However, when the data available for training is relatively small, like in many decision-making domains of interest to social scientists, purely data-driven methods have had mixed success. For example, such methods led to good performance in prediction of human decisions in economic games (8, 9) , but performed much worse than purely behavioral models in prediction of human decisions between lotteries (10, 11) .
To improve predictive performance, one can leverage the available data with knowledge from behavioral decision theories, commonly by supplying a machine learning system with theoretically-driven features (11) (12) (13) . The most natural candidates for such features are behavioral insights: qualitative human tendencies documented by the behavioral literature, such as loss aversion (14, 15) . Machine learning methods provided with various insights as features are then meant to learn from the data how to integrate them for best predictions. A less common type of theoretically-driven features are behavioral foresights. These are quantitative descriptive models, such as Prospect Theory (15, 16) , that serve to provide a functional integration of several behavioral tendencies. In other words, a foresight provides a model-based theory-driven prediction for behavior in a task, whereas an insight merely reflects one aspect that might impact behavior in the task.
The distinction between insights and foresights is akin to an old distinction between experts making a global prediction and merely identifying elements likely to be important in making a prediction (17, 18) . For example, Einhorn gave expert pathologists biopsy slides taken from patients diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease and asked them to come up with histological characteristics they considered important for prediction of survival time, as well as provide global outcome predictions. The results showed that the predictions of a statistical tool combining only the expert-derived characteristics are far more accurate than the predictions provided by the experts themselves, and the predictions are not always improved when the global predictions are added as additional features (17) . Similarly, foresights, which are essentially a researcher's integration of several behavioral insights, might not be as useful for prediction as the insights they are composed of. Advances in machine learning over the past five decades make it even more reasonable to assume that a computational system is likely to provide a more useful integration of the behavioral insights, rendering the use of foresights useless.
Nevertheless, here we demonstrate, using the results of an open competition for the prediction of human choices in a fundamental economic decisions task, that successful (i.e. reasonably predictive) behavioral models (foresights) make very useful features and that both behavioral insights and behavioral foresights are vital for achieving state-of-the-art predictions of human decisions. Our analysis prescribes a recipe for the design of effective tools for predicting human decisions when data are limited: Start with a quantitative descriptive model of behavior in the task (a foresight), decompose it to its behavioral-decision-theory elements (insights), and then supply a machine learning algorithm with both the foresights and the insights as features, assuming that their best integration will be recovered from the available data. Our results further indicate that the most useful sets of features rely on models that differ from the popular descriptive decision theories in important ways.
Choice Prediction Competition
Five of the authors of this paper (OP, RA, EE, MT, & IE; hereinafter the organizers) organized CPC18: a choice prediction competition for human choice between lotteries over time (https://cpc-18.com). Choice between lotteries underlies both the foundations of rational economic theory (19, 20) and the analyses of robust deviations from rational choice (15, 21) . The data used in the competition is the largest of its kind ever collected. It contains 270 binary choice problems selected from a single space, including demonstrations of 14 classical choice anomalies documented in behavioral decision research (e.g. the St. Petersburg's (22) , Allais' (23) and Ellsberg's (24) paradoxes). Importantly, it also includes choice behavior over time after the decision-maker receives feedback regarding previous choices, as well as choice problems in which the probabilities of one option are unknown at the time of choice (decisions under ambiguity). Of the 270 problems, 150 were used in a previous choice prediction competition (CPC15) (10) . These problems were complemented with 60 additional problems (Experiment 1) to form a public dataset available for training of competing models. CPC18 included two independent tracks. In this paper, we focus mainly on the first track, in which participants were required to develop a model predicting the distribution of play in 60 additional problems (Experiment 2). These 60 problems and the results of Experiment 2 were published only after the deadline for submission to the competition has passed 2 . 2 In the second track, participants were required to predict the decisions made by specific individual decision-makers in problems that were part of the training data (of course, choices of those individuals in those problems was not available for training). That is, the first track requires modelling of the average population choice given a choice problem, whereas the second track requires modelling of individual decision-makers. Therefore, the The organizers also published two baseline models for the first track. Such models facilitate the evaluation of developed models at an early stage, as they provide a benchmark for the level of performance achievable in the prediction task. The first baseline was a purely behavioral model (i.e. it did not use machine learning), an adaptation of the model BEAST (acronym for best estimate and sampling tools) which has proven to be a very good predictor for behavior in CPC15 (10) . Notably, BEAST does not share the assumptions made by popular decision theories like Expected Utility Theory (19) and Prospect Theory (15, 21) . Rather, it assumes choice over time is mainly driven by two behavioral mechanisms: sensitivity to the expected values and to the probability of experienced regret (and less sensitivity to four additional mechanisms, see supplementary text). The second baseline model was Psychological Forest (11), a hybrid of machine learning and behavioral theories. It includes both behavioral insights, the theoretical foundations of BEAST, and a behavioral foresight, the predictions of BEAST itself, as features. In choosing to include both types of features, the developers of Psychological Forest made, to the best of our knowledge, a rather unique design choice. More specifically, the developers of the model first decomposed BEAST to six theoretical decision mechanisms it assumes, then hand-crafted 13 features based on these six mechanisms, and finally used these 13 features, as well as the quantitative predictions of BEAST itself, in a Random Forest algorithm (25) (see supplementary text) . Notably, the organizers could not find a good predictive baseline model that did not use any behavioral foresights (e.g. using only training data in the second track is effectively much larger than the training data in the first track, and we might expect that in the first track data-driven methods would benefit more from augmentation of behavioral features. The SI provides further details on the second track. Two of the authors of this paper (ECC & JFC) made the winning submission to this second track. insights). They posited that if not using foresights can help predictions, the results of the competition would reflect it.
Forty-six teams registered to the first track of the competition. Team members included 69 researchers representing 34 institutions from 16 countries. Many of the teams invested significant efforts in developing their models. For example, in a post-competition survey (N = 29; see supplementary text), the reported mean number of hours spent on development of models was 66 (SD = 92). Twenty models were submitted in time. All submitted models but one made at least some use of behavioral decision theories, suggesting it is not easy to predict behavior in this task without them. Seven submissions were hybrid models integrating machine learning with behavioral theories. All hybrid submissions used both behavioral insights and behavioral foresights as features, suggesting using both types of features is useful for prediction.
The winning submission, made by five of the authors of this paper (DB, JCP, DR, TLG, & SJR), is based on the machine learning-behavioral decision theories hybrid baseline Psychological Forest. Specifically, it uses an Extreme Gradient Boosting algorithm (26) with the same features used in Psychological Forest (i.e. including both the behavioral insights and the behavioral foresight, the predictions of BEAST). Further details on the winning submission are in the supplementary text. To interpret the level of predictive performance of the winner and other predictors, we use a monotonous transformation of the prediction mean squared error (MSE) called an equivalent number of observations (ENO) (27) . ENO of a model is an estimate for the number of agents for whom data should be collected until their mean behavior provides a better prediction for the behavior of the next agent than the predictions of the model. The ENO of the winner is 23.7, meaning we would need to observe the choices of 24 decision-makers before the observed choice will become a better prediction for behavior of a new agent than the predictions of the winner. Table S1 provides details on these submissions.
The results of the competition imply that for prediction of human decisions in this fundamental economic decisions task, consideration of behavioral decision theories is vital.
Furthermore, they show that the best predictions are obtained by a machine learning model that uses both behavioral insights and a behavioral foresight as features.
Post-competition Analyses

Both insights and foresights?
Every hybrid machine learning-behavioral decision theory submission included both behavioral insights and at least one behavioral foresight as features. We checked whether both types of features were really necessary by training models that do not include each type and checking their predictive performance in the competition's data. Specifically, we trained on CPC18's training data both a random forest (using R package randomforest (28) ) and an extreme gradient boosting algorithm (using R package xgboost (29) ) each using a subset of the features used by the baseline psychological forest and the competition's winner. We then let the trained models predict CPC18's held-out competition data. In the "only insights" condition, the only feature removed was the predictions of BEAST (the foresight). In the "only foresight" condition, the models were trained using 15 features: 14 dimensions defining the choice problem and the predictions of BEAST. In training, hyper-parameters used were the same as in the baseline and winner. Figure 1 displays the results of this analysis. It shows that both the winner and the hybrid baseline models trained without either type of behavioral features provide predictions that are worse -sometime much worse -than when the models include both types of features. These results imply that using both behavioral insights, and especially successful behavioral foresights is key for obtaining good predictive performance. 
Which foresight is most useful for predictions?
Interestingly, all 7 hybrid submissions used as a foresight the predictions of BEAST or the predictions of a close variant of BEAST. As mentioned, BEAST is very different than classical decision models. Most classical decision models were developed to explain inconsistencies between observed behavior and the rational benchmark, under the assumption that agents facing decisions under risk understand and believe the descriptions of the payoff distributions. In contrast, BEAST, which builds on research investigating the effects of feedback, was developed to predict behavior also when this assumption is violated. For example, feedback strongly affects behavior even in decisions under risk, where it does not add information for agents who understand and believe the instructions (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) . Does the prevalent use of BEAST rather than more classical decision models as foresights imply that BEAST is more effective for prediction of choice behavior? If so, it may suggest that the underlying assumptions BEAST makes are more useful for predicting behavior than those made by classical decisions models.
We checked how the predictions of BEAST, either on its own, or when used as a foresight-feature in a machine learning system, compare with the predictions of more classical decision models. The comparison regards only a subset of the competition's data which was the main focus of classical decision research: decisions under risk without feedback (i.e. we only used choices made in problems without ambiguity in the first block of five trials in each problem). In this no-feedback subset of the data, which includes 230 different choice problems,
BEAST should be at a significant disadvantage since its main assumptions concern the effects of feedback.
To perform this comparison, each model we considered, except BEAST, was fitted to the aggregate choice rates of the 182 of these problems that were part of CPC18's training data, using a grid search. Then, the trained models all predicted the aggregate choice in the 48 problems that were part of CPC18's competition data. BEAST was compared to two versions Cumulative Prospect Theory (21), the Priority Heuristic (35) , and to the Decisions by Sampling The results of this exercise ( Table 1 ) first show that, in every case, using the predictions of a theoretical model as a foresight feature leads to improved predictions than using the predictions themselves. Further they show that BEAST, with parameters fitted to the entire training data (including problems with ambiguity and choice following feedback) predicts the decisions-under-risk subset of the data far better than any of the classical decision models tested (fit only on the decisions-under-risk subset of the training data). For this subset of the data, the ENO of BEAST used as a sole behavioral feature is 16.75. The second-best predictor, a stochastic version of Cumulative Prospect Theory, only achieves ENO of 7.57, so its predictive accuracy is less than half that of BEAST. This exercise suggests that using the predictions of a theoretical model as a foresight feature is always a good idea, but to get good predictive performance, the theoretical model itself needs to have good a-priori predictions 3 . Therefore, we suggest that when predicting human decision with limited data, one should start with a good descriptive model, and the better the predictions of the descriptive model, the better the final predictions are likely to be. More importantly, these results suggest that the assumption that agents understand and believe the instructions, which underlies classical behavioral decision research, should be reconsidered. Note. All models except BEAST were trained on the outcomes of 182 decisions under risk problems from CPC18 training set. BEAST was trained to fit the same problems but also following feedback, as well as 
Robustness Checks and Additional Datasets
We checked for the robustness of our proposed method in two additional datasets of human decisions in extensive form games (37) . To avoid having too many researchers' degrees of freedom (i.e. being able to select the method and/or analyses contingent on the outputs of the analyses; , 38), we repeated the same exact procedure used in the development of Psychological Forest: We started with a descriptive model that was proposed as a baseline in a choice prediction competition (i.e. developed before the collection of the test data), decomposed it to its theoretical insights and then used both the predictions of the model and the insights as features within a Random Forest algorithm (see SI). The results show that in both cases, the predictions of the constructed hybrid model outperform the predictions of the descriptive model in the test set of the competition and those of the same model using only one type of behavioral features (see details in SI). Moreover, in one of the datasets, the constructed hybrid model also outperformed all other models submitted to the competition, thus providing a new state-of-the-art for these data.
Interpreting the Predictions of the Hybrid Model
A central aspect determining the usability of a predictive model by some stakeholders is interpretability. Decision-makers want not only a prediction for what is going to happen, but also a reason for why it is going to happen (39) . Data-driven methods usually have very good predictive performance, but their outputs are rarely easily explainable. Descriptive models normally do not have such weakness, though their predictive power is often worse than that of data-driven methods. A nice characteristic of the method we introduce here is that in many cases, the predictions made by the hybrid model are highly correlated with the predictions made by the descriptive model used as foresight. For example, the correlation between the predictions of the winning submission in CPC18 and the foresight it uses, BEAST, is 0.963. This characteristic is of course more likely when the descriptive model performs reasonably well on its own. When it does, the main mechanisms underlying the foresight can be used to explain why the hybrid model predicts what it predicts. On its own, analyzing the mechanics of an Extreme Gradient
Boosting algorithm supplied with 38 features (the number of features used by the winning submission) is impractical. However, since we know the prediction correlation with BEAST is so high, we can reason that in almost every case, the predicted decisions are driven mainly by the expected values and the probability of experienced regret from an option (i.e. the main mechanics of BEAST).
Discussion
A main goal in behavioral science is to explain behavior. Congruently, most behavioral scientists tend to focus on uncovering causal mechanisms and discovering interesting phenomena (40) . In theory, outputs of this type of research can be useful for prediction as well. Based on our analysis, we think that to facilitate the move from elegant explanations to useful predictions, two points should be considered. First, most explanation-focused research concentrates on identifying and isolating specific mechanisms affecting behavior. For prediction, these can serve as useful behavioral insight features. Yet, our finding that behavioral foresights, which aim to integrate multiple mechanisms, is vital for deriving good predictions, suggests that behavioral scientists should focus more on the interactions and relative importance of the various mechanisms and develop quantitative models integrating these mechanisms.
Second, the focus on interesting phenomena in behavioral science inevitably leads to the study of uncommon situations. These can shed light on many important theoretical questions, but for prediction, it is better to build on insights that are robust across a wide array of situations. We speculate that this second point is the reason for the predictive superiority of BEAST over classical decision models even on a subset of the data it should have a disadvantage in (Table 1) .
Research leading to classical decision models focused on the set of situations in which agents understand and believe the information they are given, but if this set is not widespread then the resulting models will be less useful for predictions. In contrast, BEAST builds on research of basic learning processes. Many of these processes are shared by both people and animals (41, 42) , which may hint to their commonality in nature. We thus think behavioral scientists would be wise to reconsider the sets of situations they investigate.
We believe that the noisy and complex nature of human behavior raises many challenges to machine learning methods whose study can be of interest to the machine learning community.
Specifically, in our setting, state-of-the-art predictions of human decisions requires a combination of theoretical elements from behavioral decision research and data-driven machine learning systems. This calls for more use of data science practices within behavioral sciences as well as more use of behavioral theories when data scientists aim to predict human behavior (43) .
That is probably easier said than done. For example, Psychological Forest was developed by behavioral scientists using one of the easiest-to-train off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms, Random Forest. Yet, to further improve performance, the expertise and experience of data scientists using a more sophisticated algorithm were required. Similarly, many data scientists reading behavioral theory papers might not be able to easily translate them to a set of features that can be used within their systems. A nuanced understanding of the mechanics may be required in order to do so. Hence, it seems that the best prospect for development of good predictive models of human behavior may lie in more collaborations between behavioral scientists and data scientists.
Methods
Experimental task.
The task used in CPC18 is of binary choice under risk, under ambiguity, and from (50)). The extension of the current space is that now both options (rather than just one) can have up to 10 outcomes.
Two of the 14 dimensions in the space (Block and Feedback), are studied within problem. 
Experimental data.
The data used in CPC18 includes 694,500 decisions made by 926 different decisionmakers made across 270 binary choice problems drawn from the space we consider. Problems are divided into 9 cohorts. Each decision-maker faced one cohort of 30 problems in random order and made 25 choices in each problem. The first five cohorts were also used in CPC15 (10) , and details on these data are provided elsewhere. The problems in the four additional cohorts were randomly selected from the space of problems investigated in CPC18 according to a predefined problem selection algorithm (see SI). Two cohorts of problems were then run in each of two new experiments that used similar design and participant pool to those used for CPC15.
In 
Choice prediction competition.
In May-June 2017, the organizers ran Experiment 1. They then used the combined data from Experiment 1 and from CPC15 to develop their baseline models (see SI) and made the data publicly available (51) . In January 2018, they published the call to participate in the competition in major mailing lists and on social media. The competition included two independent challenges, and in this paper, we focus on the first (see SI for second track details). In that One day after the Submission Deadline, the organizers published the competition set problems. That is, submissions to the first track were blind to the problems on which they were tested. Participants were then required to run their code on the competition set problems and submit the predictions. Finally, the organizers published the data to be predicted so participants could evaluate their prediction error. The organizers verified the code for each of the top 10 submissions produces the reported predictions and published the results.
Submitted models were evaluated and ranked based on the prediction accuracy as measured by the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between the observed and the predicted choice rates (300 predictions corresponding to 60 problems X 5 blocks). In addition, the organizers computed, using a bootstrap analysis, a confidence interval for the difference in prediction MSEs between each submission and the winner, for different subsamples of problems. Specifically, we simulated 2501 sets of 60 test problems each by sampling with replacement from the original test set, computed the MSE of each submission in each simulated set, and then computed the difference in MSE between the winner and each submission. This allows the creation of a 95%
CI for the difference in predictive performance between the winner and the other submissions using Package boot (52) in R.
Data availability.
The complete raw experimental data are available in Zenodo with the identifier doi:10.5281/zenodo.2571510. (53) Code availability.
Code for the software used to generate the experimental data, for the competition's baseline models, and for the winning submission is available from the authors upon a reasonable request. Code for baseline models is also available from the competition's website (https://cpc-18.com). Code for submissions that did not win the competition is available from the authors upon reasonable request, contingent on permission from the developers of those submissions.
Supplementary Information Choice Prediction Competition
Space of problems.
The space of problems used in CPC18 includes 14 dimensions. Dimensions Block and A provides a lottery, which has expected value of HA, with probability pHA and provides LA otherwise (with probability 1 − pHA). Similarly, Option B provides a lottery, which has expected value of HB, with probability pHB, and provides LB otherwise (with probability 1 − pHB). The distribution of the lottery of Option A (Option B) around its expected value HA (HB) is determined by the parameters LotNumA (LotNumB) that defines the number of possible outcomes in the lottery, and LotShapeA (LotShapeB) that defines whether the distribution is symmetric around its mean, right-skewed, left-skewed, or undefined (if LotNum = 1).
When a lottery is defined (i.e. LotNumA and/or LotNumB > 1), its shape can be either "Symm", "R-skew," or "L-skew". When the shape equals "Symm" the lottery's possible outcomes are generated by adding the following terms to its EV (HA or HB): −k/2, −k/2+1, …, k/2-1, and k/2, where k = LotNum − 1 (hence the lottery includes exactly LotNum possible outcomes). The lottery's distribution around its mean is binomial, with parameters k and ½. In other words, the lottery's distribution is a form of discretization of a normal distribution with mean HA or HB.
Formally, if in a particular trial the lottery is drawn (which happens with probability pHA or pHB), the outcome generated is: 1 , with probability 0 2 2 1 1, with probability 1 2 2 1 , with probability 2 2
When the lottery's shape equals "R-skew," its possible outcomes are generated by adding the following terms to its EV: C + + 2 1 , C + + 2 2 , …, C + + 2 n , where n = LotNum and C + = −n − 1.
When the lottery's shape equals "L-skew," the possible outcomes are generated by adding the following terms to its EV:
n , where C − = n + 1 (and n = LotNum).
Note that C + and C − are constants that keep the lottery's distribution at either HA or HB. In both cases (R-skew and L-skew), the lottery's distribution around its mean is a truncated geometric distribution with the parameter ½ (with the last term's probability adjusted up such that the distribution is well-defined). That is, the distribution is skewed: very large outcomes in R-skew and very small outcomes in L-skew are obtained with small probabilities.
Problem selection algorithm.
The 120 problems in Experiments 1 and 2 were generated according to the following algorithm:
1. Draw randomly EVA' ~ Uni(-10, 30) (a discrete uniform distribution)
2. Draw number of outcomes for Option A, NA:
2.1. With probability .4 (NA = 1), set: LA = HA = EVA'; pHA = 1; LotNumA = 1; and 7. Draw Corr: 0 with probability .8; 1 with probability .1; -1 with probability .1 8. Draw Amb: 0 with probability .8; 1 otherwise.
In addition, in the following cases the generated problem is not used for technical reasons: (a) there was a positive probability for an outcome larger than 256 or an outcome smaller than -50; (b) options were indistinguishable from participants' perspectives (i.e., had the same distributions and Amb = 0); (c) Amb = 1, but Option B had only one possible outcome; and (d) at least one option had no variance, but the options were correlated.
Moreover, problems in Experiment 2 were selected using a stratified sampling procedure from a large pool of problems selected according to the above algorithm. This procedure was aimed to obtain for Experiment 2 roughly the same number of problems of the types "each option up to 2 outcomes", "exactly one problem with more than 2 outcomes", and "both options with more than 2 outcomes" as their numbers in Experiment 1.
Baseline models.
The organizers presented two baseline models, both heavily influenced by the model BEAST (Best Estimate and Sampling Tools) (10) . BEAST relies on six behavioral mechanisms.
Specifically, it assumes that each option's prospect is evaluated as the sum of three terms: the best estimate for the prospect's expected value (EV), estimation noise which is reduced when the problem is "trivial", and the average of a small mentally drawn sample. Elements in the small mental sample are drawn using one of four sampling tools (that imply 4 behavioral mechanisms):
unbiased (a draw from the objective distributions, implying sensitivity to the probability of immediate regret, and preference for the option which is better most of the time (54) Sixteen additional features are behavioral insights. Four of these were defined by the developers of psychological forest as "naïve", as they capture basic domain knowledge that will be likely integrated into an algorithm even without any knowledge of behavioral theories. These include the difference between the prospects' expected values, the difference between their standard deviations, the difference between their minimal outcomes, and the difference between their maximal outcomes. Twelve additional features were considered "psychological". They were hand-crafted in direct relation to the underlying logic of BEAST, and each was inspired by at least one of the six behavioral mechanisms in BEAST. For example, to capture sensitivity to the probability of regret, psychological forest includes the difference between the probability that Option A provides a better payoff than Option B and the probability that Option B provides a better payoff than option A. Positive (negative) values of this feature imply that Option A (B) is more likely to lead to less immediate regret than Option B (A). The equations defining the features all appear in the original psychological forest paper.
Random forest is an ensemble algorithm that during training constructs a series of many individual decision trees and provides as a prediction the mean prediction of all individual trees.
During training, each tree is constructed using only a random subsample of the training data, and at each split, a random subset of features is considered. These properties are meant to decrease correlation between the different trees. Psychological Forest was originally created using package randomForest (28) in R, using the default set of hyperparameters for regression. In particular, at each split, one third of the features was considered for splitting the data.
Open source code for both baselines, in several programming languages, is available through the competition's website (https://cpc-18.com).
Competition's winner.
The winning model was an extreme gradient boosting regressor (26) using the XGBoost Python package and trained using the same input features as the psychological forest baseline model described above. Like the random forest regressor used for psychological forest, gradient boosted regressors are ensembles of individual "weak learners", typically tree-based regressors.
In contrast to random forest, which averages the results of many decision trees, gradient boosting is a stepwise optimization procedure that minimizes error by adding one tree at a time to predict the residuals of an initial tree or the current ensemble of previous trees. The hyperparameters of the winning XGBoost model were the implementation defaults except for the following, which were found using the skopt Python package for black-box Bayesian hyperparameter optimization: Booster = "gbtree"; Gamma (minimum loss reduction required to make a further partition on a leaf node of the tree) = 0.01224; Boosting Learning Rate = 0.01088; Maximum Tree Depth = 3; Number of Estimators (Trees) = 978; Alpha (L1 regularization term on weights) = 0.04306; Lambda (L2 regularization term on weights) = 2.90538; Subsample ratio of columns when constructing each tree = 0.99120; Subsample ratio of the training instance = 0.50796.
Second track of the choice prediction competition.
CPC18 included two parallel and independent tracks. The paper focuses on the first track and here we briefly describe the second track. A more focused account of the second track will appear in a future paper.
Second track task.
The second track in CPC18 focused on prediction of the choices made by individual decision makers. The goal was to predict, for each of 30 "target" individual decision makers, the Protocol for participation in the second track was slightly different, and simpler, than for the first track. Specifically, participants were not required to submit their codes to the organizers, only their numeric predictions. The reason for this change is that participants in the second track knew in advance the (anonymous) identity of the target decision makers they are tested on and their corresponding target problems (the nature of the test problems in the first track was unknown at time of submission).
Second track baseline models.
The organizers presented two baseline models for the second track. The first, naïve baseline, predicts that each individual target decision maker in each block of its individual target problems would behave the same as the average decision maker behaves in the same block of that problem. The average decision maker's behavior is estimated as the mean aggregate behavior of all decision makers for which training data exists (there are at least 90 decision makers for each such problem).
Surprisingly, the organizers did not find it easy to defeat this naïve baseline by a large margin. Using many statistical learning techniques, and employing knowledge extracted from the psychological literature (e.g. based on BEAST), the best baseline that they could find was the use of a Factorization Machine (FM) (56), a predictor based on Support Vector Machines and factorization models, which is employed in collaborative filtering settings (i.e. settings in which the goal is to generate predictions regarding the tastes of particular users, for whom some data exists, using information on the tastes of many other users, as in the Netflix Challenge). Each observation supplied to the baseline implementation of the FM is composed of a long binary feature vector with only two non-zero elements that correspond to the active decision maker and the active block within an active problem. The response is the observed choice rate of the active decision maker in the active block of the active problem (first transformed to imply the maximization rate of the problem, and then after making the prediction transformed back to implying the choice rate of Option B). This means the FM model did not directly use the knowledge that behavior across different blocks of the same problem is likely correlated.
Second track submissions and results.
Twelve submissions were made before the deadline. None of the submissions provided better predictions than the naïve baseline (including the FM baseline model). In fact, the winning submission (made by two of the authors of the paper, ECC and JFC) was very similar in concept to this naïve baseline. The primary difference was that the choice-problem and block-wise average was calculated with a 10-fold cross-validation procedure. The training data supplied to contestants were split into ten sets of training, validation, and test data such that each test and validation dataset included data only from those choice problems that were known to be in the held-out dataset. The prediction for a given test observation in fold i on choice problem j in block k was the average choice made in the training data in fold i for problem j in block k. MSE was calculated for each of the ten validation datasets, and the fold with the lowest MSE was identified. The training data from that best performing fold was used to make predictions on the held-out data following the same choice-problem and block-wise average procedure Four submissions did not provide statistically inferior predictions to those of the winner. Table S2 provides details on these submissions. Importantly, all the best submissions heavily relied on the predictions of the naïve baseline.
Registrants Post-competition Survey
After results of CPC18 were published, the organizers sent co-authors of registered teams E-mail invitations to complete a short anonymous survey with questions regarding their effort and thoughts on the competition. A total of 72 invitations were sent (out of 82 registered persons;
to register, a team had to supply an Email address of only the lead author and the organizers could not recover the addresses of 10 co-authors), and 36 researchers answered the survey. Nine people indicated they were only registered to the first track of CPC18, 7 indicated they were only registered to the second track, and 20 indicated they were registered to both tracks.
Responders came from diverse backgrounds, ranging from computer science and artificial intelligence to cognitive or mathematical psychology. The most common main field of research was behavioral economics with 25% of the answers. Responders indicated they had a moderate amount to a lot of coding experience (M = 3.42, SD = 1.21) and a moderate amount of experience modeling human behavior (M = 2.94; SD = 1.45).
Twenty-four of the 29 responders who were registered to the first track indicated they also tried working on a submission to that track (only 3 stated they did not try to work on a submission, and 2 did not answer the question), and 16 of them submitted a model by the deadline. Those who tried working on a submission to the first track stated they spent on average 66.5 hours (SD = 92.2) working on CPC18, and that they tried developing an average of 12.6 different models to the data (SD = 33.3). Sixteen of the 24 also stated they were able to develop a model that outperforms the baseline models.
Nineteen of the 27 responders who were registered to the second track indicated they also tried working on a submission to that track (6 stated they did not try to work on a submission, and 2 did not answer the question), and 10 of them submitted a model by the deadline. Those who tried working on a submission to the second track stated they spent on average 84.7 hours (SD = 118.9) working on CPC18, and that they tried developing an average of 29.1 different models to the data (SD = 59.6). Only 5 of the 19 stated they were able to develop a model that outperforms the baseline models in this track. Note the reported averages for hours spent on CPC18 and numbers of models developed for the two tracks include in some cases the same response (for persons working on submissions to both tracks), and thus they should not be interpreted as the mean effort invested in each track, but as a general effort invested in CPC18.
Foresight Comparisons Implementation Details
Cumulative prospect theory.
We compared BEAST to two versions of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (21) 
,0
is a subjective utility function with α a diminishing sensitivity parameter (note we use the same parameter for gains and losses, following the suggestion in (57)), and λ a loss aversion parameter, and: The latter is a two-parameter subjective weighting function (58) with γ a probability sensitivity parameter and δ the function's elevation parameter.
For the deterministic version, best fit for the training data was obtained for α = 0.88, γ = 0.89, δ = 0.9, λ = 1.2. For the stochastic version, best fit was obtained for α = 0.91, γ = 0.84, δ = 0.83, λ = 1.14, and μ = 0.25.
Priority heuristic.
The priority heuristic (PH) (35) is said to be triggered only for choice between lotteries with similar EVs. Following others (59), we screened each problem according to the ratio between the options' EVs: If it is greater than 2, then PH is not triggered. We assumed instead that in such cases the option with the higher EV is selected. If the ratio is smaller than 2, PH is used as follows (note PH requires no fitting of parameters, so it was not technically fit to the training data): 
Decision by sampling.
The decision by sampling model for risky choice (36, 60) states that choice is set by a series of ordinal comparisons between target attribute values and a comparison attribute value.
An accumulator tallies the number of favorable comparisons to one of the options and when the tally hits a threshold, the option that won more comparisons is chosen. Target attribute values are chosen randomly at each time step. Comparison attribute values are also chosen randomly, though they can be chosen either from the alternative option or from long term memory.
We used the implementation from http://www.stewart.warwick.ac.uk/software/DbS/source_code.html. As "context" that is used for long term memory retrievals, we used the supplied csv files from the same source, providing "real world distributions of amounts and probabilities". Before implementing the code, amounts (from the "real world distribution") were converted from British Pounds to Israeli Shekels at an exchange rate of 4.5 shekel per pound.
Three free parameters were fitted to the decisions under risk subsample from the training data: outcome threshold and probability threshold, which are the minimal amount and probability by which a target attribute value should exceed the comparison attribute value to be considered favorable, and a choice threshold, which is the number of comparisons an option needs to win in order to be chosen. Best fit was obtained for the values 1, 0.1, and 1, for outcome threshold, probability threshold, and choice threshold respectively.
Analysis of Additional Datasets Method
Data.
The data comes from two related choice prediction competitions for human decisions in The experiments used the strategy-method according to which players mark their choices without knowledge regarding the choices the other players make. Therefore, in each pair, choices made by the two players were independent. Additional information regarding the setting is given in the original paper and in the competitions' website:
https://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/home.
In each competition, data regarding choices made in 120 problems (training data) was made public. The goal was to predict the choice behavior in the other 120 problems (test data).
To facilitate development of models, the organizers of the two competitions presented their best baseline models trained on the train data. Baselines for both competitions were similar and assumed players consider one of seven strategies: (a) choosing rationally (according to the 
Development of hybrid models.
To develop the models based on the insight-foresight method we propose, we started with the baseline models and decomposed them to the theoretical mechanisms they imply are the main drivers of choice. Specifically, the behavioral insights we derived are the predictions made by the seven strategies assumed by the baseline models. In addition, we also used as foresight the predictions made by the baseline models themselves (fitted on the training data). Finally, we also added the six game-parameters as "objective" features. We then applied an off-the-shelf Random Forest algorithm (using randomForest package (28) in R), without any training of hyperparamters, and with the objective features, the insights-features, and the foresight-feature to the data. We repeated the process 15 times and the predictions were averaged. Error were computed based on an average of 20 such runs.
Technical details of results
In prediction of the decisions made by the first players, the hybrid model using both Note. Only models providing predictions not statistically worse than the winner are presented. To test for differences is predictive performance, we used a bootstrap procedure with 2501 samples from the competition set problems and computed a percentile-type 95% CI for the difference between MSEs of the winner and each model. ENO = Equivalent number of observations. Logistic regression with the following predictors: prediction of the naïve baseline, dummy for higher-EV option, target individual maximization rate in non-target problems, output of a logistic transformation of the difference between options' EVs, and several interactions between these predictors and a dummy for a nonambiguous problem.
CJ26
9.803 Ensemble of the naïve baseline and a random forest algorithm as in Submission CJ25 from the first track.
EC02
9.973 A type of tree-based regression (Cubist) using each dimension that described a problem, various averages based on those dimensions and subject information, as well as features calculated by BEAST.sd.
Note. Only models providing predictions not statistically worse than the winner are presented. To test for differences is predictive performance, we used a bootstrap procedure with 2501 samples from the group of target decision makers and computed a percentile-type 95% CI for the difference between MSEs of the winner and each model.
